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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. NATURE OF THE CASE.
This case entails the long-standing efforts by the State of Idaho, Idaho Department of
Transportation ("State") to provide alternative access for the initial taking of direct access to the
Appellants' property ("Property") when U.S. Highway 30 was converted to Interstate 80N (later
1-84), that ultimately failed on May, 16, 2016, but which the State now insists it has no such duty
because any suit to obtain just compensation for that failure should have been instituted years
before despite its continuing multiple attempts to resolve access and its express promise to not
raise the passage of any limitations period. The district court's decision deprives Appellants
Bennett G. Day, as Trustee of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust,
John Day, Dan E. Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs, and David R. Day
("Appellants") from developing their 307 acre Property located near Isaac's Canyon, southeast
of the city of Boise in Ada County to its highest and best use.
The genesis of this suit was a 1967 ROW Contract and corresponding recorded deed
restriction obligating the State, in addition to paying compensation for the real estate then taken
for the construction of the Interstate, to avoid paying further compensation for its taking of direct
and unrestricted access along approximately 1,000 feet of highway frontage bordering the
Property by promising to build a frontage road to provide public access to the Property. Over the
years, the State worked diligently, both independently, and with the Appellants, on planning and
constructing the frontage road. The road and its route as originally planned were overtaken by
the construction of the Isaac's Canyon Interchange ("Interchange") in 1997, which eliminated
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the originally-planned route southwest of and parallel to I-84. The parties continued to work
together to ensure that public access would be restored, and the State, recognizing that this would
be challenging and time consuming, promised that it would waive any statute of limitations
defense until those efforts were exhausted.

The State continued working with Appellants

towards accomplishing its goal and acknowledging that it would fulfill its promise, but on May
16, 2016, because it had earlier ceded jurisdiction of the only road that could provide access to
the Ada County Highway District ("ACHD"), the ACHD declined to approve the "approach" the
State had sought for public access to Appellants' property. Thus, the State's promise to provide
the public access proved then to be unachievable. Six months later, the Appellants filed suit to
obtain just compensation. However, the State refused to honor its promise to not raise the statute
of limitations defense and persuaded the district court to dismiss their complaint on that very
basis. The Appellants appeal the decision as it denies them the just compensation that is their
due, is contrary to applicable law, and goes against the applicable principles of equity.
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
1. Isaac's Canyon Real Property interests owned by the Day Family.

The Property in this case consists of two quarter sections in the vicinity of Isaac's
Canyon, consisting of the NEl/4 and the SEl/4 of Section 19, Township 2 North, 3 East, Boise
Meridian, Ada County, less the Interstate right-of-way. The chronology of the Day Family's
ownership begins in 1935 when Ernest George Day and Emma N. Day purchased the first
quarter, the NEl/4 of Section 19, less the right-of-way for the then-existing U.S. Highway 30.
(See R., pp. 393-394.) Following Ernest Day's death in 1953, the Property interests were held in
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the name of his wife Emma N. Day, and their three sons, Donald M., Robert L., and Ernest E.
Day. (Id., p. 394; see also pp. 37-44 (Compl., Exs. 2, 3, 4).) In 1975, Donald M. Day purchased
the adjoining SEl/4 of Section 19 for the benefit of the family. (R., p. 394.) Both quarters were
purchased with the intention of developing the land at some future date. (R., pp. 252-53.)
Subsequent to Emma N. Day's death, on May 17, 1989, the property she and her late
husband acquired was divided equally between her three sons, with Donald M. Day also agreeing
to split the SE 1/4 of Section 19 he acquired in 197 5 into three equal shares with his two brothers.
(R., pp. 253, 395.) On February 21, 1992, Ernest E. Day transferred his 1/3 interest in the
Property to the Ernest and Lois Day Living Trust ("EEDLT"). (R., p. 395.) On December 30,
1994, Donald M. Day's interest in the Property was first conveyed to the Donald M. Day Family
and Marital Trust ("DMDFT") and, immediately thereafter, the DMDFT transferred the 1/3
interest equally between Donald M. Day's children, Bennett G. Day, David R. Day, and Donna
Day Jacobs. (R., pp. 172-75, 395.) On July 15, 1998, Robert L. Day's 1/3 interest was conveyed
equally to EEDLT and the Donald M. Day and Marjorie Day Family Trust ("MDFT").

(R., pp.

182-86, 395-96, 400-04.) None of the Appellants are aware of, and no evidence was submitted,
that any assignment, conveyance, or reservation of the Property, or rights related to the Property,
was transferred prior to this conveyance by Robert L. Day. (R., pp. 583-84.)
On December 29, 1998, EEDLT transferred its interest in the Property equally to the two
children of Ernest and Lois Day, Dan E. Day and John F. Day. (R., p. 396.) The deed to Dan E.
Day and John F. Day provides that the Grantors "grant, bargain, sell, convey, and confirm ... all
of the Grantor's undivided one-half interest . . . together with all . . . hereditaments and
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appurtenances thereunto .... " (Id. at pp. 406-10.) Similar to the transfer of the Robert L. Day
interests in the Property, no evidence was presented to contradict the Appellants' family records
and understanding that any of the Property rights were separated or reserved from the Ernest E.
Day interests prior to the 1998 transfer. (R., pp. 584-85.) Under a December 2, 2005 Purchase
and Sale Agreement, Edmonds Groves Land Holdings, Inc. purchased the Property and gave the
Appellants a mortgage back, but the purchase soon after failed in the economic downturn and the
Property was transferred back to the Appellants. (See R., pp. 203-13.)
On August 13, 2013, individually, and as Trustee of the MDFT, Bennett G. Day
transferred a 1/18 interest in the MDFT and his individual interest in the Property to Holcomb
Road Holdings, LLC, a limited liability company wholly owned by Bennett G. Day. (R., pp.
585, 594.) Both of these deeds included the language "all of its rights, title and interest ...
together with any undiscovered interest therein, together with all of the appurtenances pertaining
thereto." (R., pp. 412-17.) Again, no evidence was presented to contradict the Appellants'
evidence stating that no rights related to the Property had been previously separated or reserved
from the interests owned by Bennett G. Day prior to these conveyances. (See R., pp. 585, 594.)
No evidence in the record shows any further conveyances or transfer of interests related to the
Property that would have separated any interests away from the Appellants and the Appellants'
family, nor did the various generations' estate planning arrangements attempt to separate the
various interests to the Property away from the Appellants' family. (See R., pp. 596-98.)
At the time the Appellants filed this lawsuit, complete fee simple title to the Property was
vested, and continues to be vested, in: Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day
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Family Trust, created by Instrument dated March 24, 1977 (an undivided 1/9 interest); John F.
Day (1/4); Dan E. Day (1/4); Donna Day Jacobs (1/9); David R. Day (1/9); and Holcomb Road
Holdings, LLC (1/6). (See R., pp. 588-92.)

2. Transfer and reservations of access rights related to the Property.
At the time of the initial transaction to the Appellants' family in 1935, Highway 30
bisected the parcel, allowing direct access along the entire bordering Highway. (R., p. 252, 26566; see also R., p. 4 71, Affidavit of [State employee] James Morrison, filed on May 31, 2017
("2 nd Morrison Aff. "), Ex. D, p. 3 (History and Description of Subject Before July 1961)
("Access to U.S. Highway #30 is approximately 1,700 feet ... [and] [t]here is no limitation to the
access.").) In 1961, the Property's access to the public roads changed dramatically when the
state highway was converted to a controlled-access federal interstate, I-80N.

Initially, an

Agreement was reached on November 17, 1961 with the State for the Days' Property required
for construction of the Interstate.

(R., pp. 37-41.)

On October 23, 1967, a Right-of-Way

Contract ("ROW Contract") was signed granting the Appellants' family payment for the 8.99
acres and related access required for the new highway. (R., pp. 42-43.) The ROW Contract also
specifically granted that the Appellants' family access to the Property "southerly of the Interstate
Highway will be available from the future frontage road and stock drive on the southwesterly
side of I-80N. (I-IG-80N-2(16)54)." (Id.) A map attached to the ROW Contract depicted the
future frontage road. (Id.; see also R., pp. 219-23; 2nd Morrison Aff., R., p. 461 ("The land on
the south consisting of 139.58 ac. will lose the access to the hwy. There will be r/w provided for
the land along the interstate r/w ... "). The accompanying Warranty Deed to the State also
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included a specific reservation for these access rights: "access to the Future Frontage Road and
Stock Drives on the Southwesterly side of Interstate 80N, Project No. I-IG-80N-2(16)54." 1 (R.,
pp. 44-45.)
The parties understood that it would be some time before development and a "frontage
road" reached the Property, so the 160 acres would have to wait for this public road access to be
scheduled. (R., pp. 252-53; 2nd Morrison Aff., R., p. 471 ("It has been held for future use since
and, according to Donald Day, the son, was to be held until ripe for sub-dividing.").) Even at
that time, it was understood that the highest and best use would be for residential use. (Id.) Up
until the construction of the Isaac's Canyon Interchange, access was over a 50-foot right-of-way
that was not easily passible for the last 1.5 miles to the Property. (R., p. 253.)

3. The Property's access is eliminated by the construction of the Isaac's Canyon
Interchange, but the State continues to work with Appellants' family to get a
public road built to the Property.
In the 1990s, the State began working on the new Isaac's Canyon Interchange less than a
mile from the Property. As part of the project, the State acquired easement rights to extend the
1

The State utilized a commonly recognized method of reducing its damages by promising, by way of the 1967
ROW Contract, to build the future frontage road. In doing so, it substantially limited its damages to a partial and
time-limited reduction in access to the Property. As the negotiations neared a conclusion later in 1967, Don Day
recognized that obtaining a future frontage road would be the best way to preserve development of the Property and
specifically would still permit the mixed use or residential development that was the highest and best use of the
Property, especially if he could get the State to agree to a frontage road bisecting the SW remainder. (See, e.g., R.,
pp. 467-93.) That would still enable the potential for multiple points of access along the frontage of that access
road. Thus, he accepted far less than he thought was due in 1967 because he was able to obtain the State's promise
to build this frontage road. See 26 Am Jur 2d § 312, p.723:
The condemning authority may act to reduce the damages to be paid by limiting, through
agreement or stipulation at the time of condemnation, the mode of use or the extent of the right
that is to be acquired. Thus, stipulations, and matters deemed to be binding stipulations or
agreements or reservations of rights, have been held to reduce or mitigate damages, and a party
condemning lands may bind itself to a specified plan of construction or specified use of property,
and have the damages assessed on that basis. Later changes made, or diversions from the
originally projected use may call for additional damages.
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frontage road, by then known as Eisenman Road, to the Interchange. (R., pp. 17-18, 58-62.)
However, the original route of the frontage road was "obliterated" by the Interchange. (R., p.
336.) And what remained of the frontage road did not reach the Property. (R., p. 254.) After
construction of the Interchange, the State transferred jurisdiction and maintenance to the access
location southwest of the Interchange to the ACHD. (See R. pp. 356-57.)
Since the Interchange destroyed the previous plans for a public road to the Property, in
May, 1996, the State acquired an easement in a portion of the NE1/4SW1/4 of Section 18 "FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CONSTRUCTING OR INSTALLING THEREON a Stock Drive and
Future Public Road by the state of Idaho" ("Aldecoa Access"), and a Highway Easement Deed in
the SE1/4SW1/4 and SW1/4SE1/4 of Section 18 to reconnect the Property directly to the public
roads ("BLM Access"). (R., pp. 254, 280-91.) The Appellants recognized that the rights-of-way
could not be used to build a public road because of the narrow, severe slopes and turns, and
communicated those concerns to the State. (R., pp. 254, 295-301.) In 2000, the State
acknowledged that the alternative or relocated route did not provide the same level of access
originally promised or provided. Thus, the State began to work with ACHD to provide suitable
access to the Property. (R., pp. 303-06.) Initially, an additional 10-foot strip was purchased
from the Nicholsons and Yankes ("Yanke Access") to widen the Aldecoa Access to 60 feet, and
the BLM Access was relocated to terrain that would come closer to satisfying ACHD public road
requirements ("Floating Access"). (R., pp. 255, 308-21.) With the Floating Access, the BLM,
on April 6, 2000, relinquished the BLM Access for a temporary floating easement for
construction of a road to an "adjacent landowner" (the Appellants), which location would
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become permanent if a different location was not requested.

(Id. at 313-21; see also 2nd

Morrison Aff., R., p. 495.) However, these changes did not improve the conditions necessary for
construction of a public road. (R., pp. 86-87 ("I have met with ACHD's Traffic Engineer and he
confirms that the easement does not meet ACHD standards."); R., p. 255.) Despite its efforts,
the easements the State obtained proved impassable, including what was to be the final
connection which required an impassable tum within a 24.9' x 30' rectangle. (R. pp. 630-31.)
As the State continued to work on the access, it asked the Appellants to be patient, its
Deputy Attorney General Steven Parry specifically writing on July 19, 2000:
I have had the opportunity to meet with ITD's District 3 management and
representatives from the Headquarter' s Right-of-Way section on the access issues
involved with your clients.
To provide you with some historical perspective, when these issues first arose and
the Department attempted to resolve the problem it was the portion of the
easement over the BLM land that the engineer's perceived to be the problem. The
portion of the new right-of-way easement seems to be resolved with the new
easement from the BLM. During that process, the Department obtained an
additional ten feet of right-of-way from the Nicholson's to increase the width of
the easement over the property from fifty feet to sixty feet. The problem appears
to be the easement over the Nicholson property. The property is over terrain with
contours too great to construct a frontage road or effectively use the easement for
ingress and egress.
ITD's District Three's Project Development Engineer and Right-of-Way
Supervisor have gone out to the site and viewed the property to determine if and
how the easement can be relocated. I have not heard back from them at this point
in time. The District and the Headquarter's Right-of-Way Section are reviewing
funding sources in order to reach a solution to this problem. I would request that
you provide the Department an extension until September 5, 2000 or shortly
thereafter to be able to give you a firm proposal on a solution to this access issue.
I truly believe the Department is taking this matter seriously and will have some
type of proposal to provide substitute access to the property. I will also represent
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to you that the Department will not assert any type of statute of limitation
defense if an agreement on new access cannot be reached.

(R., pp. 325-26 (emphasis added).) The Appellants took the State at its word. (R., pp. 256-57,
262.) They believed that the taking of its direct access to the public roads was only temporary,
that the State was taking the issue seriously, and that the State had waived any statute of
limitation defense until a new access agreement could not be reached. (R., p. 262.)
In early 2010, the State met with Pioneer Title that had identified seven different
challenges to legal access to the Property and was refusing to insure legal access. (R., pp. 258,
367.) The State worked to resolve these issues, and it continued to assure the Appellants that it
was working on solutions. The State tried various approaches, e.g., negotiating with the two
intervening property owners regarding changes to the existing public road easements, negotiating
with ACHD regarding the construction of a public road on the existing road easements, and
pricing the cost of building the public access road from Eisenman Road to the Property over
various potential routes. (R., pp. 258, 336-37.)
Regarding the unworkable route previously acquired by the State, the Aldecoa Access
and Yanke Access were intended to connect to Eisenman Road at what has been referred to as
the Green Gate in this litigation. (See R., pp. 421-22.) The State would need ACHD's approval
for the "approach" where a public road could be built to connect to Eisenman Road. (See R., pp.
339-57.) An agreement for an approach at the Green Gate needed for construction of a public
road was not reached at the time of the construction of the Interchange. (Id.) An agreement for
other approaches in the area affected by the Interchange construction was reached between the
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State and ACHD, but it did not include the Green Gate location. (R., pp. 356-57.) The State
appealed to the ACHD for an approach at the Green Gate location to provide the Appellants
"with an opportunity for development," but later withdrew the appeal. (R., pp. 339-54, 359.)
During this time, the State was also unsuccessful in attempting to build a road from Eisenman
Road to the Property, including an offer to pay the Appellants to build a road themselves despite
the access and terrain issues, that the Day Family declined. (R., pp. 259-61, 339-61.)
Eventually, on May 16, 2016, ACHD made it clear that it would not accept an approach
for a public road at the Green Gate, the location of the existing road easements:
To clarify, what I said is that ACHD will not accept a public street between the
off ramp and the future Lake Hazel/Eisenman intersection ....
(R., p., 363.) With this final pronouncement from ACHD, the State learned that it would never
be able to provide a public road from Eisenman Road to the Property at the location that the State
intended and had been trying to utilize since 1997. Even if the road easements from Eisenman
Road to the Property were sufficient for a public road for the Property's development (i.e. wide
enough and level enough, with manageable turns), the road easements still cannot be used to
build a public road because ACHD will not approve a road at that location, or some other closeby location, that could access the easements the State had assembled. (R., p. 363.) The Green
Gate location continues to not meet ACHD standards for a public approach. (R., pp. 86-87.)
Following ACHD's firm and final denial of the public road, the State did not suggest any
new alternative for restoring the Property's direct access to the public roads. (R., p. 261.)
Therefore, the Property's only access to Eisenman Road and the public road system beyond is
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via a mile-long, narrow, inadequate private uninsurable easement over impassible topography.
This greatly diminished access is not anything compared to what was taken in 1961-67; not
comparable to what was promised in 1967 as future substitute access; not comparable even to
what existed from 1967-1996 as placeholder access; not what the State intended to be the access
after 1997-98; and not the access minimally necessary to develop the Property, 307 acres.
Through all of this, the Appellants were patient in waiting for an adequate resolution by
the State and relying on the many admissions in word and action regarding the obligation to
restore public road access through the frontage road, the most notable are summarized as:
1.

The State widened the entire road easement that would immediately connect to Eisenman
Road from 50 feet to 60 feet wide. The State obtained two new easements from third
parties in order to widen the road easements. (See R., pp. 254-55, 303-21.)

11.

The State negotiated extensively with third parties the BLM, the Nature Conservancy,
and then Baker Investment, in order to obtain a new route for half of the road easement,
acknowledging that the prior route had been unbuildable. (R., pp. 325-26.) The State
further agreed that once built, if relocation was requested by the underlying property
owner, it would be responsible for the cost of the realignment. (R., pp. 313-21.)

111.

The State admitted: "After the interchange was constructed, the Department determined
that some of the new right-of-way did not provide the same level of access as was
provided in the original right-of-way that was established in 1967." (R., at pp. 303-04.)

1v.

The State admitted that one part of the road easement, closest to the frontage road, was
still unbuildable: "The problem being the terrain is so steep and sloping that ACHD will
not approve any public road access using the easement. I have met with ACHD's Traffic
Engineer and he confirms that the easement does not meet ACHD standards. Also, the
approach to Eismann [sic] Road is at a right angle and does not meet ACHD standards."
(R., pp. 86-87.) The State further admitted: "When the Isaac's Canyon Interchange was
constructed, the [frontage road] easement was moved to adjoin the interchange" even
though the State had promised "Access to the Future Frontage Road." (Id.) The State
finally concluded, "the Day Family has two probable courses of action. They could take
the matter to the Transportation Board, at which time the District and Headquarters need
to be in a position to respond. The second alternative would be to file suit based upon a
taking of access (inverse condemnation) and ITD's breach of its covenant in the original
deed." (Id.)
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v.

The State worked on relocating the road easement: "The problem appears to be the
easement over the Nicholson property. The property is over terrain with contours too
great to construct a frontage road or effectively use the easement for ingress or egress.
ITD District Three's Project Development Engineer and Right-of-Way Supervisor have
gone out to the site and viewed the property to determine if and how the easement can be
relocated . . . the District and the Headquarters Right-of-Way Section are reviewing
funding sources in order to reach a solution to this problem." (R., pp. 88-89.)

v1.

The State admitted, "the Department will not assert any type of statute of limitations
defense if an agreement on new access cannot be reached." (Id.)

v11.

The State tried to engineer a road through the road easements and had to design a road for
a "speed of 15-20 mph." (R., pp. 90-92.) ACHD reviewed the plans and said that 90
degree turns on 50 or 60 foot easements was not workable: "One deficiency did stand out.
The District standard minimum centerline radius for a local street is 100-feet. The
drawings indicated at least two comers with a 50-foot radius." (R., p. 93.) ACHD also
said that the State's plans were not sufficiently detailed: "More detailed plans would be
required for review to determine if the design meets all District standards." (Id.) ACHD
also pointed out that "the land use planned and the volumes of traffic ... could affect the
design standards." (Id.)

vn1.

The State admitted that it had an obligation to resolve all issues with insurable access:
"Pioneer Title has raised questions and does not believe they can insure the property due
to defects they perceive in the easement. . . . it is the Title Company that has the final
say on the issue where the Department is transferring an undeveloped access road
easement." (R., pp. 95-96.) The State met with Pioneer Title and tried to come up with
solutions for providing insurable access. The State admitted: "The bottom line is that
before the Isaac Canyon Interchange was constructed the Day property had insurable title
to its property and had a legal right of access. With the construction of the interchange
they will not be able to provide title insurance without going through litigation." (Id.)

1x.

To resolve some of the Title Company's concerns, the State agreed to get an
acknowledgement from the third party whose property was burdened by the road
easement. (Id.) The acknowledgements would state that the road easement was "for the
purpose of an access road right-of-way for the benefit of the Day family and other
similarly situated property owners." (Id.) The State further stated: "If the underlying
property owner declines to agree to an acknowledgement then the Department may want
to consider a quiet title action on the exact nature of the Highway Easement Deed .... "
(Id.) Despite the written commitment it made in 1967, in 2010, the State indicated that it
did not want to solve the access issue by actually building a road on the road easements
because that would "involve huge costs." (Id.)

x.

The State made a formal application to ACHD for an "approach" to serve its road
easements. (R., pp. 339-54.) In the application, the State admitted that its negotiations
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with ACHD in 1996 resulted in an agreement that did not account for a road to be built at
the location of the road easements. (Id) The State also admitted that the "existing
approach location allow the Day Family only limited opportunity to develop their rural
property to the south." (Id) The State explained: "A future public road is needed to
accommodate the potential site-generated traffic volumes. . . . The Day Family cannot
construct a public street at a location that meets ACHD policies because of intervening
property owners." (Id) The State requested a 40-ft approach despite its prior
engineering plans that required at least a 60-foot approach to try and make the immediate
90 degree turn workable. (Id) The State provided ACHD with a copy of the contract
where the State had promised access to the Property from the frontage road. (Id)
x1.

In 2015, the State offered $560,000 to the Plaintiffs so that they could try to build a road
over the road easements. The Days declined. (R., pp. 361, 942.)

Ultimately, however, the State failed, suspended its efforts, and refused to honor its written
promises and the Appellants were obliged to file this lawsuit.
C. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.
The Appellants filed a breach of contract claim and an inverse condemnation claim on
November 1, 2016. The State filed for partial summary judgment on April 28, 2017, contending
that the Appellants did not have a sufficient breach of contract claim, that the claims arose in
1997, that only owners of the Property in 1997 had standing to bring a claim for inverse
condemnation, that a recovery should only be applied to the property identified in the ROW
Contract and accompanying Warranty Deed, and that the Appellants had affirmatively mitigated
their damages.

(R., pp. 149-50.) The Appellants filed a cross-motion for partial summary

judgment on May 17, 2017, to address the taking of direct access, that for valuation purposes, the
taking occurred at the completion of the Interchange construction, and that the State had waived
any statute of limitations defense. (R., pp. 225-26.) The district court heard oral arguments on
the cross-motions on June 14, 2017. (See R., p. 935.)
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At the end of June, and the beginning of July, the parties then filed requests to the district
court to bifurcate the matter. (R., pp. 544-64.) The court held a hearing on the bifurcation issue
on July 12, 2017. (See R., p. 935.) On July 7, 2017, the Appellants filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment regarding conveyances of rights to a condemnation award, and on July 11,
201 7, a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding marketable and insurable title. (R., pp.
565-66, 611-12.) The State then filed its Motion to Dismiss on July 15, 2017, regarding the
statute of limitations.

(R., pp. 718-19.)

On July 28, 2017, the district court filed its

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Mitigation of Damages, denying the State's mitigation of
damages argument on summary judgment. (R., pp. 731-37.) The hearing for the additional
partial summary judgment motions and motion to dismiss was held August 14, 2017, and the
court allowed further briefing on the issue of equitable estoppel and waiver. (See R., pp. 935,
908-09, 930-33.)

The district court released its Memorandum Decision and Order on

October 11, 2017, finding that only two of Donald M. Day's children, Donna Day Jacobs and
David R. Day, had standing to pursue an inverse condemnation claim, that no Appellants had
standing to pursue the breach of contract claims, and that the suit had been untimely filed,
dismissing the case with prejudice. (R., pp. 934-65.)

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Did the district court use the wrong standard of review and err by treating the
State's Motion to Dismiss like a motion for summary judgment, and by not giving
notice to the parties of its determination to review the Motion to Dismiss under
the Rule 56 standard?

2.

Did the district court err by: (a) applying a statute oflimitations principle relevant
to payments on debt to conclude that the State's waiver was limited, regardless of
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the extent of the State's subsequent actions confirming its obligation to provide
access to a "Future Frontage Road;" (b) not appreciating the true extent and
nature of the waiver, and not recognizing that the Appellants' claims could not be
subject to dismissal until May 16, 2016; and (c) considering that the parties'
stipulation for valuation purposes also locked an agreed-upon date for accrual
purposes?
3.

Did the district court impermissibly rely on evidence not in the record and fail to
recognize (a) conveyances and deed restrictions that were in the record and (b)
principles of real property law to deny Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Re: Conveyance of Right to Condemnation Award and grant the State's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding standing?
III.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Appellants are claiming attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) if
they are ultimately determined to be the prevailing party.
IV.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS' APPEAL

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Summary Judgment Standard of Review.

A summary judgment is reviewed on appeal under the same standards employed by the
district court. Manwaring Invs., LC v. City of Blaclifoot, 162 Idaho 763, 768, 405 P.3d 22, 27
(2017). If the parties have filed cross-motions, the applicable standard ofreview is not changed;
the court must evaluate each motion on its own merits.

Id.

The district court is to grant

summary judgment if the movant can show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id., n.1; I.R.C.P. 56(a). "The
facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party." Path to Health, LLP v.
Long, 161 Idaho 50, 54, 383 P.3d 1220, 1224 (2016). However, the party opposing summary
judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the
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party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. Additionally, the "moving party is entitled to
judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case .... " Silicon Int'l Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155
Idaho 538,544,314 P.3d 593,599 (2013) (internal citation omitted).
In inverse condemnation cases, all issues other than just compensation are resolved by the
trial court as the trier of fact. See, e.g., Covington v. Jefferson Cty., 137 Idaho 777, 780, 53 P.3d
828, 831 (2002) (citing Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 596 P .2d 75 (1979), for the holding that all
issues regarding inverse condemnation are to be resolved by the trial court, except the issue of
what is just compensation); see also State v. HI Boise, LLC, 153 Idaho 334, 337, 282 P.3d 595,
598 (2012) ("The issues of the nature of the property interest alleged to have been taken and
whether a taking has occurred are questions of law."); City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho
851,857,853 P.2d 596,602 (Ct. App. 1993) ("all issues, whether legal or factual, other than just
compensation, are for resolution by the trial court"). However, since the broad issues of the
nature of property interest alleged to have been taken or whether a taking has occurred are
questions of law, this Court may freely interpret those issues and is not bound by the district
court's findings. Covington, 13 7 Idaho at 780, 53 P .3d at 831. "When the language of a contract
is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and legal effect are questions of law." Shawver v.
Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354,361, 93 P.3d 685,692 (2004).
Where the trial court will be the trier of fact, "summary judgment is appropriate, despite
the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving
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the conflict between those inferences." Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322,
325, 17 P.3d 266, 269 (2000).
2. Standard of Review for Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.

Similar to the review of motions for summary judgment, but different in the scope of the
court's consideration, all inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving party in review of a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 833, 243 P.3d 642, 649
(2010); Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm 'n, 141 Idaho 129, 133, 106 P.3d 455, 459 (2005). The
scope of the court's consideration is limited to the pleadings. Taylor, 149 Idaho at 833,243 P.3d
at 649. After all inferences from the facts asserted in the pleadings are made in favor of the nonmoving party, the primary question is whether a claim for relief has been stated, and is not
whether the party will ultimately prevail. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d
1157, 1159 (2002). Ultimately, the determination is whether the non-moving party is entitled to
offer evidence to support its claims contained in the pleadings. Id.

If matters outside the

pleadings are presented to the court and examined by the court in review of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the "motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56."
I.R.C.P. 12(d). In such a case, all "parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all
the material that is pertinent to the motion." Id.; Paslay v. A&B Irrigation Dist., 162 Idaho 866,
869,406 P.3d 878,881 (2017); Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep 't ofAdmin., 159 Idaho 813,
823, 367 P.3d 208, 218 (2016) ("The rule requires that when a motion to dismiss is treated as a
motion for summary judgment, 'all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent .... '").
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B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS

On October 11, 2017, the district court impermissibly dismissed the Appellants' claims.
(R., p. 934-65.) While noting that it would consider the State's Motion to Dismiss on the basis
of the statute of limitations under Rule 56, it failed to provide the necessary notice required
under Rule 12. Further, regardless of under which standard the Motion to Dismiss was analyzed,
the district court failed to view all evidence in favor of the non-moving party. Regarding the
analysis, the court misapplied clear statute of limitations law, conflating the date of accrual with
the date agreed as the date of take for purposes of valuation of the inverse condemnation claim
and applying the wrong date in its decision. Even if the date of the take for purposes of valuation
were to be the applicable date for statute of limitations purposes, the district court failed to
recognize the true nature and consequence of Parry's promise waiving the statute of limitations
defense. That waiver, along with the State's partial performance of its promise and ongoing
uncertainty related to the promise, extended the deadline to file a suit against the State. The
court failed to recognize the Appellants' right to have its constitutionally protected claims
decided on the merits and instead focused on irrelevant circumstances to dismiss this matter.
1. The District Court Impermissibly Analyzed the State's Motion to Dismiss Under
a Rule 56 Standard Because the State Did Not Present Any Matters Outside the
Pleadings.
As stated above, a Motion to Dismiss is to be reviewed by making sure that all inferences
are viewed in favor of the non-moving party and the Rules of Civil Procedure require all parties
be given an opportunity to present all applicable materials when a court reviews the motion
under Rule 56. Syringa, 159 Idaho at 823, 367 P.3d at 218. The district court stated in its
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decision that it would analyze the State's motion to dismiss under Rule 56. (R., p. 944.) The
court did not notify the parties of its intention to do so; this was error. Since Appellants were not
made aware of the court's intention to address the State's motion to dismiss under Rule 56
simultaneously with the other pending motions, the Appellants were not given an opportunity to
present evidence designed to refute any issue considered by the district court in the State's
motion to dismiss, or to seek additional time to conduct discovery under I.R.C.P 56(d)(2). The
Appellants' right to present its full case and have it determined on its merits was ignored.
In response to the Appellants' motions for partial summary judgment, the State filed its
motion to dismiss, based solely on its contention that the applicable statutes of limitation relating
to the claims in the Appellants' Complaint had all passed. The Appellants reasonably relied on
I.R.C.P. 12(d) that it would not be required to defend the motion to dismiss under Rule 56 since
the State did not present matters outside the pleadings. I.R.C.P. 12(d) ("If, on a motion under
Rule 12(b)( 6) ... matters outside the pleadings are presented to ... the court .... ") (emphasis
added); Taylor, 149 Idaho at 833, 243 P.3d at 649 (stating the only "facts which a court may
consider on a motion to dismiss are those appearing in the complaint" and "a trial court, in
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, has no right to hear evidence") (quoting
Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273,276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct. App. 1990)). However, here,

the district court decided to analyze the State's motion with Rule 56 evidence presented in
pending motions for partial summary judgment. Admittedly, one of the Appellants' pending
motions for partial summary judgment addressed the consequences of the State's waiver of a
statute of limitation of defense, but not the actual application of a statute of limitations defense to
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the Appellants' allegations in its Complaint. 2 Regardless, the district court found it "necessary"
to consider the different motions together. (R., p. 944, n.42.) This decision is contrary to the
protections of the applicable rules. Thus, the dismissal should, at the very least, be vacated and
the case remanded, giving the Appellants an opportunity to file Rule 56 materials in opposition
to the State's motion.

i.

Rule 12 protections require remand of this action so that either the district
court can analyze the State's motion under the allegations of the
Appellants' Complaint or so that it can provide Appellants with an
opportunity to provide Rule 56 materials in opposition to the State's motion.

On appeal, the Appellants object to not being notified that the district court would review
materials not included in the pleadings or the State's motion, not being notified that the district
court would rule on the State's motion per Rule 56, and not being given an opportunity to file all
materials allowed under Rule 56 in opposition to any materials presented by the State in its
motion or contained in the Appellants' Complaint that the district court viewed as applicable to
the issue. The State's motion went to the allegations contained in the Appellants' Complaint, yet
the court converted it to a motion on the merits of the case relying on inferences arising from
circumstances presented in other motions, although the State's motion presented no additional

2

Appellants' May 17, 2017 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Access and Waiver of Statute of Limitation
Defense argued in part that the State had waived defenses related to the delay in bringing the inverse condemnation
action. The Appellants' motion did not address issues related to accrual or application of a statute of limitations
defense, just that the State had waived the defense. In fact, the district court's representation that the Appellant's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding the statute of limitations issue is not supported by the record. (R.,
p. 963.) The motion is titled "Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Access and Waiver of Statute
of Limitation Defense" and requests the district court to rule that the Property has no access to the public road; that
the State is liable for taking said access; that the date of the taking for valuation purposes is the completion of the
Isaac Canyon Interchange project; and that the State waived any defense related to delay in bringing the inverse
condemnation action. (See R., p. 249.) Thus, considering the Appellants' motion for partial summary judgment as
addressing the merits of the statute of limitations - aside from the issue of waiver - is unwarranted.
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materials. 3 Rule 12(d) states that parties "must be given" a "reasonable opportunity to present all
the material that is pertinent to the motion" once it is determined by a Court that a Rule 12(b)
motion should be converted on the basis that the motion was originally supported by Rule 56
materials. I.R.C.P. 12(d). Such a determination is only permitted once "matters outside the
pleadings are presented." Id.
The Rule specifically contemplates that the court is not to treat a motion to dismiss as one
for summary judgment until matters outside the pleadings are "presented." See Taylor, 149
Idaho at 832-6, 243 P.3d at 648-52 (stating the court is to only look at the pleadings). In Taylor,
the Supreme Court found that the district court "erroneously considered" materials from the
record in ruling on a Rule 12 motion to dismiss. Id. at 836, 243 P.3d at 652, n.4. According to
this Court, a district court has no right to take judicial notice of any other facts, other than facts
of common knowledge, that controvert allegations in the complaint. Id. at 833, 243 P.3d at 649.
Therefore, the Taylor Court ruled that the district court could not take judicial notice of the
challenged details from the underlying case in its ruling on the motion to dismiss. Id. In support
of its decision, the Court quoted with emphasis Fleming v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922 F.2d 20, 23
(1st Cir. 1990), recognizing that a fundamental difference between a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion and a
Rule 56 motion is the grounds for "a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal comprise only the pleadings and no
more." 149 Idaho at 833,243 P.3d at 649. It also cited to Hellickson, stating that the Court of

Appeals had found the magistrate judge's taking judicial notice of two other proceedings for a

3

For example, the district court, in support of it granting the motion to dismiss, drew inferences in the State's favor
from items not in the pleadings or the State's motion, namely uncited references to the previous foreclosure on the
Property (R., p. 941) and evidence related to the parties' communications between 2001 and 2010 (R., pp. 941, 942).
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motion to dismiss determination in error and remanded with "instructions to either decide the
12(b)(6) Motion on the allegations contained in the complaint alone, or to convert the 12(b)(6)
motion to a Rule 56 summary judgment proceeding and afford the parties reasonable opportunity
to present materials pertinent to a motion for summary judgment." Id. Here, similar to the
erroneous decisions discussed in Taylor and Hellickson, the district court's conversion of the
State's motion to dismiss based on its determination that it could unilaterally take judicial notice
of unpresented facts outside the pleadings was error. Rule 12(d) does not allow the district court
to make such a determination until such matters are directly presented to it on motion. That did
not happen in this case and should be ruled error by this Court.
In addition, as implied in Hellickson above, the Rule contemplates that the Court is to
provide every party notice when it converts a motion to dismiss under this provision. See Doe v.
Presiding Bishop of Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 837 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1156 (D.

Idaho 2011) (ruling on a nearly word-for-word provision in current Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(d)).
We think the emphasis in summary judgment practice has been, and must
continue to be, on actual notice. This is made clear not only by Rule 56 itself but
also by [former] Rule 12(b), which expressly provides that when extra-pleading
matters are presented, "all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." Without such notice
that allegations of fact are being made for the record, there is no real opportunity
to enter the responses necessary to create the "genuine issue of material fact"
which can stave off summary judgment.
Sardo v. McGrath, 196 F.2d 20, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1952); see also State of Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry,
Rall, Barber & Ross, 585 F.2d 454, 457 (10th Cir. 1978) ("In such circumstance the trial court

should give the parties notice of the changed status of the motion and thereby provide the parties
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to the proceeding the opportunity to present to the court all material made pertinent to such
motion by Rule 56."). However, in this case, the district court converted the State's motion to a
summary judgment motion, allowing the district court to examine materials outside the State's
motion and Appellants' Complaint. The Appellants were not provided with any notice or an
opportunity to present all material on which they could have been expected to rely on in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Wilkicki v. Brady, 882 F. Supp. 1227,
1229 (D.R.I. 1995) (citing lOA C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2720, at 27) ("This 'notice' requirement consists of providing 'an adequate opportunity to
demonstrate why summary judgment should not be granted' to the party against whom judgment
is entered."). Thus, the record cannot support a finding that the Appellants received adequate
notice and opportunity to be heard in opposition to the district court's view of the State's motion.
Since notice is specifically required under Rule 12(d), the district court's failure to provide such
is a basis for remand, with directions similar to those cited from Hellickson in Taylor above to
afford Appellants a reasonable opportunity to present pertinent materials. 149 Idaho at 833, 243
P.3d at 649.
2. The District Court's Decision Dismissing the Appellants' Claims as Untimely
Filed Under Applicable Statutes of Limitation is Not Supported by the Relevant
Law.
In addition to erring in converting the State's motion to dismiss to a motion for summary
judgment, the district court applied incorrect principles and facts in its statute of limitation
decision. To reach its decision barring the Appellants' claims under the applicable statutes of
limitation, the district court incorrectly applied the date of accrual of Appellants' claims and
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ignored, or refused to consider, all allegations, evidence, and arguments related to the State's
attempts to perform on its promise, and the efforts made by the parties to resolve the access
interruption and multiple problems caused by construction of the Interchange. Therefore, the
district court's decision should be overturned and remanded to decide Appellants' claims on the
merits.

i.

The district court did not apply the correct date of accrual of Appellants'
claims for purposes of determining whether the Appellants' claims were
timely filed.

On summary judgment, the State argued that there was no genuine issue of material fact
to prevent the conclusion that if any claims were viable, they arose in 1997. (R., p. 133.) In its
Memorandum Decision and Order, the district court concluded that the Appellants' case had
been untimely filed and dismissed the Appellants' claims with prejudice. (R., p. 935.) The
district court found that the date of accrual was December 5, 1997, the date the parties agreed
was the date of taking for purposes of valuation only. 4 (R., p. 954.) However, the district court
ignored the record before it on summary judgment and instead relied only on two allegations
from the Complaint to conclude that the Appellants acknowledged the date of accrual was in
1997 for purposes of the inverse condemnation claim.

(Id.)

Similarly, for the Appellants'

contract claims, the court relied only on one allegation from the Complaint to avoid reviewing
the record. (R., p. 955.) The Appellants introduced evidence to support its assertion that, while
that date could be used for valuation purposes, it was not the date of accrual. (See, e.g., R., pp.

4

The State first argued on summary judgment that the date of valuation should be December 5, 1997, to which the
parties stipulated at hearing. (See R., p. 144; Transcript, p. 15, I. I I ("We've agreed to the valuation date.").) The
parties did not agree as to any accrual date.
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251-367.) The State acknowledged on summary judgment that the record showed that the cause
of action arose at some point between 1997 and 1998. (See R., p. 144.) However, the court
failed to consider the materials filed in opposition to the State's motion for partial summary
judgment for purposes of the accrual issue and decided in the State's favor.
In assessing a statute of limitations defense, the primary question is the date the relevant
claim accrued and then the follow up question is when the lawsuit commences.

Skaggs v.

Jensen, 94 Idaho 179,180,484 P.2d 728, 729 (1971) (focusing on whether "more than five years

elapsed between the time the cause of action accrued and the time suit was instituted"); see also
W T. Rawleigh Medical Co. v. Atwater, 33 Idaho 399, 195 P. 545 (1921) (finding the right of

contract action accruing "immediately upon" breach).
Idaho Code § 5-216 requires a party to commence litigation within five years for actions
based upon a written contract or obligation. The import of the statute is that an action must be
commenced within five years of the date the cause of action accrued, not within five years of
when the agreement became effective. The basis for a cause of action grounded on a written
agreement is typically a breach of the agreement. Thus, under LC. § 5-216, causes of action
based on a written agreement must be commenced within five years of the breach of the
agreement. Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 517, 198 P.3d 740, 746 (Ct. App. 2008) ("A
cause of action for breach of contract accrues upon breach for limitations purposes.").
For an inverse condemnation claim, the applicable statute of limitations is LC. § 5-224,
which requires litigation be commenced within four years of the cause of action accruing.
C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 143, 75 P.3d 194, 197 (2003). For
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§ 5-224 purposes, the date of accrual for an inverse condemnation action is fixed "at the point in
time at which the impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial
interference with plaintiffs' property interest [becomes] apparent."

Harris v. State ex rel.

Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 401, 405, 210 P.3d 86, 90 (2009) (citations omitted). For an inverse
condemnation claim, the cause of action accrues at the time "the full extent" of the "loss of use
and enjoyment of the property becomes apparent." McCuskey v. Canyon Cnty. Comm 'rs, 128
Idaho 213, 216-17, 912 P.2d 100, 103-04 (1996). When it "becomes apparent" is when the
impairment is of "such a degree and kind" to show a "substantial interference" with a property
interest. Higginson v. Wadsworth, 128 Idaho 439, 442, 915 P.2d 1, 4 (1996) (quoting Tibbs v.
Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979)).

For valuation purposes,

compensation for a taking is required when access to a public way is taken. See Hughes v. State,
80 Idaho 286, 291-96, 328 P.2d 397, 399-402 (1958) (impairment of a right of access constituted
a "taking of property"); see also HI Boise, LLC, 153 Idaho at 337-41, 282 P.3d at 598-602 ("We
have long held that access to an adjacent public way-even in the absence of an expressly
deeded right-is one of the incidents of land ownership, the taking of which may require
compensation."); Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 135 Idaho at 325, 17 P.3d at 269 ("This
Court has recognized the right of a property owner to access a public way is a vested property
right appurtenant to the land abutting the public way in question, and that an unreasonable
limitation upon such a right may constitute a taking requiring compensation."); Brown v. City of
Twin Falls, 124 Idaho 39, 41-44, 855 P.2d 876, 878-81 (1993) ("a right of access is a property
right which can be the basis for an inverse condemnation claim"). The Appellants provided
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more than a "bare and conclusory assertion" that the date for accrual purposes was not the same
as the date for valuation purposes. (See R., p. 955.)
Here, the two important dates for the statute of limitations determination are May 16,
2016, and November 1, 2016. However, the district court erred in ignoring the Appellants' view
on when the applicable claims accrued and the circumstances created by the State. While it was
the State that filed the motion for partial summary judgment regarding the date of accrual and the
motion to dismiss for purposes of the statute of limitation issue, the Court chose not to interpret
any inferences from the record in the Appellants' favor and instead focused only on three
allegations in the Complaint on the State's converted summary judgment issue and
impermissibly interpreted facts and documents not in the record in the State's favor. Therefore,
the district court's finding that the Appellants failed to timely file their Complaint should be
overturned.
The Appellants filed the present case on November 1, 2016, less than six months
following notice that the State would be unable to fulfill its promise to provide the Appellants'
Property with public access. However, the district court eventually determined that the May 16,
2016 notice was inapplicable to the Appellants' claims and based its claim accrual and statute of
limitations determinations on December 5, 1997, the date that was stipulated by the parties to be
only the date of the governmental taking of the Appellants' public access for purposes of
valuation of its inverse condemnation claim. The determination that the December 5, 1997 date
controls fails to consider the record before the district court as to the seemingly temporary nature
of the December 5, 1997 action and the permanency of the May 16, 2016 action which also
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effectively made the December 5, 1997 action permanent. 5
a. Access was temporarily "taken" in 1997 by construction of the
Isaac's Canyon Interchange, but the circumstances of this case do
not dictate that this date should be used for purposes of
determining the date of accrual.

Idaho law recognizes that there may be circumstances in which the accrual of a claim
may be challenging to determine, and reliance on a simple "aphorism," such as a cause of action
for breach accrues upon breach, or simply that a statute of limitations does not begin to run until
the cause of action accrues or when a party may sue another, may be of little help.

See

Magnuson Props. P'ship v. City of Coeur D'Alene, Docket No. 26364, 2002 Ida. App. LEXIS 1,
at *11-12 (Ct. App., Jan. 7, 2002), rev'd on other grounds. Instead, for purposes of determining
when a breach occurred, the terms of the contract and the nature of the dishonored obligation are
important. Id.
In Balivi Chemical Corporation v. Industrial Ventilation, Inc., regarding a counterclaim
for breach of an oral contract, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's determination of
an accrual date. 131 Idaho 449,958 P.2d 606 (Ct. App. 1998). At issue were amounts owed on
the books for ordered goods and services between sister corporations at the time one of the
entities, Industrial Ventilation, Inc. ("IVI") was purchased. A previous agreement between the
joint owners of both corporations required IVI to "unbill" an invoice previously paid by the
remaining entity, Balivi Chemical Corporation ("Balivi") for tax purposes, and return the

5 While the date of valuation may normally be the same date as the date of accrual, given that the State was in
control of the actions that unnecessarily extended the date of the ultimate permanent taking, this case warrants
relaxation of the normal. Additionally, if the principle is to be applied without exception, then the tail of the
valuation date should not wag the dog of the accrual date, and May 16, 2016, should be the date of both.
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payment, with the understanding that IVI would later be rebilled and it would repay the amount
owed. Id. at 451, 958 P.2d at 608. Balivi later filed suit related to a series of accounting
mistakes, and IVI filed a counterclaim asserting that Balivi never repaid the agreed unbilled
amount. Id. at 450, 958 P.2d at 607. The district court granted summary judgment for Balivi on
the counterclaim, agreeing that the suit arose on the date the goods were delivered and the
services were rendered. Id. at 452, 958 P.2d at 609. However, the Court of Appeals reversed
and adopted IVI' s position on the date of accrual, finding that it was the "rebilling agreement"
that was breached, and that the suit could not have arisen until that time at which the amount
would have been rebilled. Id. The Court reasoned that the claim on the invoiced work could not
have accrued because, under the agreement, the amount owed had been fully paid on the books at
a later date. Id. Since it would have been illogical to require IVI to file a lawsuit for an amount
that had not been billed, the district court could not have found that the statute of limitations had
run. Id. Thus, the applicable time limit for suit was a "reasonable time" to take action since the
rebilling had not yet taken place. Id.
Similar to Balivi, the circumstances here require a review of the agreements between the
parties and the obligations promised. The State entered into an Agreement with the Appellants'
family on November 17, 1961, providing "approximately nine acres of which, along with related
access rights, are believed by the Department [of Highways] to be required in connection with
the construction of Interstate Highway 80N under the terms of Highway Project No. I-80N2(3)61" but acknowledged that the parties were "unable at present to negotiate reasonably for the
purchase" because of the "uncertainty" future construction will have on access and the need for
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future interchanges and frontage roads.

(R., pp. 268-72.) On October 23, 1967, the parties

agreed to provide for the purchase of said nine acres previously identified, and in addition,
stipulated that the Appellants' Property would receive access "from the future frontage road and
stock drive on the southwesterly side of I-80N." (R., pp. 274-75.) This same assurance was
included as an exception to the access rights granted to the State on the accompanying Warranty
Deed delivered to the State. (R., pp. 277-78 ("except for: access to the Future Frontage Road
and Stock Drives on the Southwesterly side of Interstate 80N, Project No. I-IG-80N-2(16)54
Highway Survey").) Thus, the obligation of the State was to provide access through a "Future
Frontage Road and Stock Drives."
However, similar to the circumstances prior to rebilling in Balivi, construction of the
Interchange interrupted the parties' agreement for the future frontage road to the Property, and
Appellants would have had to conclude that the State's obligation would never be fulfilled to
then file suit. Instead, Appellants chose to remind the State of its continued obligation to ensure
access to the Property, writing the State's traffic engineer on December 12, 1997, seven days
after the State now contends the cause of action accrued. (R., p. 65.) The State promptly assured
Appellants that the lack of access caused by the Interchange was only temporary. (R., pp. 25362. )6 Appellants' deferral in filing suit provided the State with an opportunity to perform and did
not unnecessarily encourage litigation. See Schwartz v. Wasserburger, 117 Nev. 703, 707, 30
P.3d 1114, 1116 (2001)). 7 The actions of the State supported the assurances and were consistent

6

The State actually began working on the alternative route to the Appellant's Property in 1996 when it assigned the
Aldecoa Access. (R., pp. 280-82.)
7
See also C & G, Inc., 139 Idaho at 148, 75 P.3d at 202 (Hohnhorst, J., specially concurring):
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with honoring Appellants' decision to give the State an opportunity to perform, as the State
continued to work on obtaining suitable access to the Property. (See R., pp. 253-62.)
Unfortunately, after several years of the State's fairly consistent efforts to perform, with
both cooperation and assistance from the Appellants, it became apparent on May 16, 2016, when
the ACHD advised that the required approach was unattainable, that the State no longer would be
able to provide the promised access. (R., pp. 261, 363.) Also, similar to the compulsion to file a
counterclaim in Balivi, the Appellants realized upon the ACHD denial that they could no longer
rely on the State to perform. The Appellants concluded that they were required to file suit as the
lack of suitable public access was no longer, as previously suggested by the State, a temporary
problem. The ACHD denial was the first real indication that the State could not perform as
promised, although the State has now disavowed and repudiated its obligation. (R., p. 363.)
Like the relief granted in Balivi, the Appellants should not be punished for their determination
not to sue in 1997 and instead work with the State to give it time for performance. Based on the
decision in Balivi, the Appellants were legally entitled to elect when they could pursue their
claim without fear that its continued allowance and joint efforts with the State to resolve the
access issues would be held against them for purposes of a statute of limitation defense. 8

To compel the landowner to produce evidence which is unnecessarily conjectural in an attempt to
predict his loss before either its existence can be confirmed or its amount can be measured
represents a result which is neither just to the landowner who has wrongfully been deprived of his
property nor the public which must pay the just compensation required by the taking. It is not
unreasonable to require a governmental entity which has violated a citizen's basic constitutional
right to remain subject to suit until the occurrence of actual loss attributable to its wrongful
conduct can be verified and valued.
8
This is especially true, considering that during these ongoing attempts the State explicitly stated that it would
waive a statute of limitations defense should the parties be unable to resolve the access issue. The Appellants
outline the implications and nature of the State's waiver in Section IV.B.3 below.
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b. For purposes of this action, the extent of the taking and that it was
truly permanent occurred on May 16, 2016, when ACHD refused
to allow access for a public road.

Appellants elected to pursue their claims upon the information received on May 16, 2016,
revealing the permanent nature of the elimination of direct public access caused by the
construction in 1996-97. With the permanency of the construction's effect on the access and the
State's subsequent disavowal of its obligations to provide the Future Frontage Road, it then
became clear shortly after May 16, 2016, that the taking had taken place and the original 1967
agreements had been breached. Therefore, for purposes of the statute of limitations issue, the
Appellants' claims did not accrue until May 16, 2016. See Club Lane Ass 'n v. Armstrong, 1983
Del. Super. LEXIS 729 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983) (finding claim for breach accrued at party's
disavowal or repudiation of its obligations).
As previously explained, the district court chose only to review three paragraphs of the
Complaint to support its decision that the November 1, 2016 lawsuit was untimely and dismissal
warranted per the State's statute of limitation motion. While the paragraphs cited, 13, 14, and
55, provide support when viewed out of context of the entire record, the remaining allegations in
the Complaint (the only document cited in the State's Motion to Dismiss, and the only document
to be at issue for a proper review under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion), support the Appellants'
consistent thesis that it did not and could not know the true extent of the accrual of its claims
until May 16, 2016. (See R., pp. 954-55.) As explained above, it was not until that date that it
was apparent to the Appellants that the destructive consequences of the Interchange construction
were not temporary, as earlier suggested by the State.
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Following the two paragraphs cited by the district court, the Complaint contains the many
steps the State took to avoid litigation. (R., pp. 18-29 (ill 5, "ITD recognized its obligation to
provide the promised access ... it has taken various steps to try and fulfill its obligation";

,r,r16-

19, State acquiring easements; if24, working on other solutions after December 1997; if25,
acquiring easement in 1999; if26, updating Appellant on resolution, acknowledging obligation in
2000; if27, 2000 Highway Easement Deed; if28, 2000 State memorandum; if29, extension and
waiver; if30, 2000 department memorandum; if31, 2001 ACHD memorandum; ifif32-35, working
with state on title issues; ifif36-37, State efforts to build road; if38, offer of $560,000 for
Appellants to build road; if39, but "[a]fter prolonged negotiations" ACHD denies approach; if42,
current easements not meeting ACHD standards.).)
The Complaint then avers that the claims for inverse condemnation and breach are based
on the results of the 1997 Interchange construction, and makes clear that the parties continued to
work to resolve the issues after its construction, and that it was not clear until 2016 that a
resolution was not possible. (R., pp. 31-33 (if51, "Recently, it became clear that [the State] will
not be able to resolve the takings .... "; if58, "It is now clear that [the State] will not be able to
resolve the breach .... ").) The record, as detailed above, also includes evidence introduced by
the Appellants supporting these allegations. (R., pp. 251-367.) However, these facts made up no
part of the district court's decision as it failed to acknowledge that Balivi-based circumstances
could provide protections for the Appellants, and ignored the record, instead concluding that the
1997 date was the only date for statute of limitations purposes.

Granted, looking back, the

construction of the Interchange initially ruined access and breached the parties' agreement and
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therefore did give rise to an accrual argument. But the record makes it clear that there were
continued efforts by the State buttressing Appellants' expectation that the State would fulfill its
1967 promises, or at the very least continue to negotiate, to avoid having to pay just
compensation for its 1996-97 actions. The Appellants' expectations of the State, and the State's
ability to perform were all brought to an end on May 16, 2016, as the circumstances then proved
any continuation would be in vain. Accordingly, it was error for the district court to ignore those
circumstances and base its decision on only three allegations in the Complaint without
examining, at the very least, all allegations in that pleading. Since the claims did not fully arise
until May 16, 2016, it was error to conclude that the November 1, 2016 Complaint was untimely.

3. The District Court Misunderstood the Nature and Consequence of Parry's
Promise to Not Raise the Statute of Limitation Defense Until the Occurrence of a
Future Event that the State Dictated-When an Agreement of New Access
Could Not Be Reached.
Even if the Court were to adopt the district court's date of accrual of the Appellants'
claims, it must find that the district court failed to understand the full effect of the State's July
19, 2000 letter (referred to as Parry's Promise in the district court's decision), which included
explicit confirmation that the State would not "assert any type of statute of limitations defense if
an agreement on new access cannot be reached." (R., pp. 88-89.) The district court's decision
concluded that at the most, Parry's Promise could "merely" extend the applicable statute of
limitation deadlines one additional period. (R., p. 957.) Notably, the unstated premise of the
district court's decision was that Parry's Promise was made within the limitation period for both
the contract claim and the inverse condemnation claim. The court concluded that the statutes of
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limitation were only extended four years from Parry's Promise for the inverse condemnation
claim, and five for the breach claims. (Id.) In reaching the decision, the district court misapplied
LC. § 5-238, failed to recognize the promise as an enforceable standstill or tolling agreement,
refused to consider the full intent of the Appellants' arguments related to the doctrine of
justifiable uncertainty, failed to correctly apply the record and circumstances of this case to its
equitable estoppel analysis, and incorrectly gauged the effect of the intervening sale and
foreclosure on the State's obligation to the Property.

By doing so, it was able to avoid

recognition that the statutes of limitation were tolled until at least May 16, 2016. Therefore,
even if the December 5, 1997 date were to be considered as the date which the Appellants'
claims arose, this Court should find that the subsequent Parry's Promise timely tolled the
applicable statutes of limitation, allowing the Appellants to file suit on November 1, 2016. This
Court can and should reverse the district court's decision denying Appellants' partial motion for
summary judgment that Parry's Promise waived the statute of limitations even if
December 5, 1997 is regarded as the date of accrual. That determination requires an analysis of
Mr. Parry's writing-essentially a unilateral offer that the Appellants accepted-and is a question
of law over which this Court can exercise free review. "When the language of a contract is clear
and unambiguous, its interpretation and legal effect are questions of law."

Shawver v.

Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 361, 93 P.3d 685, 692 (2004). See also Killinger,

135 Idaho at 327, 17 P.3d at 271. Parry's Promise is clear and unambiguous. Thus, the Court
should reverse the district court's ruling denying the Appellants' motion for partial summary
judgment on waiver and enter partial summary judgment in Appellants' favor.
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i.

The district court misapplied J.C. § 5-238 by finding that the State's waiver
of the statute of limitation defense was only applicable for a limited amount
of time.

On July 19, 2000, Deputy Attorney General Steve Parry wrote Appellants' then-counsel.
The letter made reference to the then 33-year-old agreement, specifically stated that it was to be
in reference to the "Right of Way Contract, Project No. I-80N-2(3)61 and entered into by State
ofldaho Department of Highways and the Day Family on 10/23/67 (Isaac's Canyon)." (R., pp.
88-89.)

Parry stated that he was responding to a previous letter "concerning access issues

involving the Day family property around Isaac's Canyon." (Id.) Parry continued by relating
some historical perspective about the State's attempts to "resolve the problem" and the terrain of
the area including "contours too great to construct a frontage road." (Id.) Parry then requested
additional time to provide the Appellants with a "firm proposal on a solution to this access
issue," stating that the State was currently reviewing the property and funding sources, fulling
expecting that proposal would provide "substitute access to the property." (Id.) In concluding
the letter, Parry presented next steps for the two potential courses that the parties' negotiations
would take-one should the promised proposal be suitable and the parties reach an agreement for
the new access, and another course of action, should they not. (R., pp. 88-89.) If the proposal
were to be agreeable, the State requested that the Appellants provide a reciprocal easement
across their property for any property owners to the east historically using an earlier version of
the access the State obtained. (R., p. 89.)
However, "if an agreement on new access cannot be reached," Parry promised that the
State "will not assert any type of statute of limitations defense." The subsequent proposals did
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not readily lead to resolution, but the Appellants relied on Parry's Promise as they continued to
work with the State to obtain the promised "new access" arising from the 1967 ROW Contract.
(R., pp. 256-57 ("We ... agreed to not file a lawsuit while the State continued to work on fixing
the public road access issue. I relied on the State's efforts because the State repeatedly said that
it had an obligation to restore the Property's direct/frontage access to the public roads ... the
State had tried to fulfill that obligation, the State admitted that its first and second attempts to
fulfill the obligation had not been sufficient, and the State stated that it was still working on the
issue.").)
Eventually, on November 1, 2016, less than six months after receiving notice that the
State could not provide the promised public access, the Appellants filed suit. The State filed an
Answer to Complaint on November 25, 2016, claiming as an affirmative defense that the
Appellants' claims were barred by the statute of limitations established by LC. §§ 5-216 and 5224. (R., pp. 117-26.) The Appellants filed a motion for partial summary judgment on May 17,
2017, requesting the district court rule as a matter of law that the State had waived the defense in
writing. (R., pp. 238-39, 247-49.) Then on July 15, 2017, the State filed its motion to dismiss,
arguing that the Appellants had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because
the claims were barred by the statute oflimitations. (R., pp. 718-19.)

a. The district court erred by finding that the Parry Promise was
similar to an acknowledgment of a debt or obligation.
In its decision, the trial court adopted the State's argument that Parry's Promise was the
equivalent to a mere acknowledgement of a debt or obligation, and as such simply restarted the

37

statute of limitation for one additional period. But Parry's Promise was quite different from the
cases relied upon by the trial court-a payment on, promise, or acknowledgement of an
obligation. See Horkley v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 879, 881, 173 P.3d 1138, 1140 (2007) (a $15,000
payment restarted the statute of limitations on claim against a promissory note); Moulton v.
Williams, 6 Idaho 424, 426, 55 P. 1019, 1019 (1899) ("[I]ndorsement upon the note and

mortgage ... is merely an acknowledgment or new promise ... and [will] start anew the running
of the bar of the statute."). In both of these cases the inquiry was whether the payment, or other
ambiguous action, constituted "sufficient evidence" to "take the case out of the operation" of the
applicable statute of limitation. The rule adopted over a 100 years ago was that such payments
would be interpreted as signaling the obligor's intent to waive the statute of limitation as a
defense for one additional statutory limitation period.
Here, however, there is no need to apply this rule of law which imposed a somewhat
arbitrary but still logic-driven result on the debtor/creditor relationship. Mr. Parry's statement
was entirely unlike a partial payment or a mere written "acknowledgement," which requires
some interpretation and is capable of variable meanings. Thus, Mr. Parry's statement is not
constrained by LC. § 5-238 and the rule this Court fashioned to extend the statute of limitations
by one limitation period.

Parry's Promise is an explicit waiver of the statute of limitation

defense until the occurrence of a future event, or more precisely, when it became apparent that a
future event would not occur, in this case-"when an agreement on new access cannot be
reached." (R., p. 89.)
Importantly, the cases relied upon by the district court to extend the statute of limitations

38

only one additional statutory period, instead of until the occurrence of a future event explicitly
dictated by the State outlined in Parry's Promise, do not involve waivers. The creditor cases
instead involve affirmative actions by debtors, which by operation of law, reaffirm debts owed.
See Sunny Ridge Village Partnership, 118 Idaho 330, 331, 796 P.2d 539, 540 (Ct. App. 1990)

(finding that under LC. § 5-238, if the obligor simply makes a partial payment after the maturity
date, but does nothing more, it is rightly deemed a new promise to satisfy the debt for limitation
purposes).

The debtors (or their attorneys) in Horkley and Moulton did not provide their

creditors with written waivers notifying that they would not assert any type of statute of
limitations defense, as the State did here. No authority was cited by the district court to extend
the rule analyzed in Horkley and Moulton to a situation involving an explicit written waiver.
Furthermore, LC. § 5-238 has been held to only apply "where a debt may normally not be
recovered due to the application of the statute of limitations, but where the debtor reinstates the
running of the limitations period by acknowledging the debt."

Brower v. E.l DuPont de

Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 783, 792 P.2d 345, 348 (1990). Therefore, it was error for the

district court to conclude that under LC. § 5-238, Parry's Promise merely extended the statute of
limitations one additional period.
b. The district court failed to consider the Parry Promise as an
enforceable standstill agreement or tolling agreement waiving the
statute of limitations.
The Parry Promise was a written agreement unilaterally dictated by an authoritative
employee of the State explicitly declaring its intent to not pursue a statute of limitations defense
until it was determined an agreement for access could not be reached. In effect, the State's
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written agreement was akin to a standstill or tolling agreement.
A standstill or tolling agreement is viewed just like any other contractual arrangements in
Idaho. See, e.g., Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 144, 150, 90 P.3d
894, 900 (2004). In Nerco, a professional malpractice claim may have accrued at a point in
January 1990, so the parties agreed on December 17, 1991, to extend the potential running of the
statute of limitations until November 24, 1993. See id.

The Supreme Court recognized the

parties' agreement as a tolling agreement that lasted until the stated 1993 date. Id. Eventually,
the claim was pursued more than two years after the agreed-upon date and the Court found that it
was ultimately time barred even after taking the tolling agreement into account. Id. Similar to

Nerco, the Appellants received written assurance that under certain circumstances the State was
not going to pursue a statute of limitations defense. However, the written agreement here was
not as limited as the one in Nerco as there was not a date limit, but was instead tied to a future
event. As the Appellants have continued to contend, the contingent element of the Parry Promise
did not reduce or prohibit its enforceability.
Below, the State argued that the Appellants' position on the Parry's Promise equates to
one that could potentially last forever, thereby inviting the proclamation that such an
interpretation violates public policy.

(See R., p. 896; Transcript, p. 88, 1. 24 - p. 89, 1. 4.)

However, even if it were established to be an open-ended waiver, no law directly prohibits such a
waiver. While no Idaho case law has been located which addresses this issue, the Ninth Circuit
has upheld an indefinite extension of a limitation period. United States v. Caldwell, 859 F.2d
805 (9th Cir. 1988).
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In Caldwell, the Court disagreed with the district court's finding that an "open-ended
waiver" of a non-jurisdictional statute of limitations undermined policy concerns "which animate
the statute of limitations" and could only be upheld in extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 805.
The Court found no reason to distinguish between a limited-term waiver and an open-ended
waiver and reversed the district court's decision. Id. at 806. The defendant in Caldwell argued,
similar to the State's argument below, that courts should never uphold open-ended waivers. In
rejecting that blanket approach, the Court focused on the fact that the statute of limitations is not
jurisdictional and can be waived, and then focused on the standard usually reviewed-whether
the waiver was knowing and voluntary. Id. Here there is no question that the waiver was made
knowingly and voluntarily, as it was initiated and made by a Deputy Attorney General. Further,
Idaho law has not held that a limited agreement not to raise a statute of limitations defense based
on the occurrence of a future event (here if new access could not be agreed upon) is against
public policy. Instead, this Court has reasoned, similar to the Caldwell Court, that a statute of
limitations is not jurisdictional, and that it is "subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling."
Bryant v. City of Blaclifoot, 137 Idaho 307, 312, 48 P.3d 636, 641, n. 1 (2002).

A similar result was reached in Atlas Finance Corporation v. Kenny, a California case
addressing similar conditional waivers and statutory provisions as the present case. 9 68 Cal.
App. 2d 504, 157 P.2d 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945). In Atlas, the company attempted to recover
possession of gambling equipment that had been seized by the California Office of Attorney

9

In Dern v. Olsen, the Idaho Supreme Court found that former Section 4078 of the Revised Codes (later updated
and amended to current I.C. § 5-238) was identical to Section 360 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California, the
code section addressed in Atlas. See 18 Idaho 358,365, 110 P. 164, 166 (1910).
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General and stored in a warehouse. Id. at 505-06, 157 P.2d at 402. The Attorney General had
demurred to the company's complaint on the grounds that the action was barred by the statute of
limitations and that its office had not previously waived the statute of limitations. Id. at 506, 157
P .2d at 402. One of the issues was a statement by a Deputy Attorney General official that so
long as the company paid the storage charges "the said personal property should remain in
storage intact and would not be destroyed and that plaintiff could bring suit at its own
convenience and whenever it so desired." Id. at 509, 157 P.2d at 403 (italics in original). The

complaint had alleged that this and other statements had "lulled plaintiff into a sense of security"
as far as the statute of limitations was concerned, and that the attorney general's office knew that
the company believed it would not be compelled to file suit if it continued to pay rent for the
storage unit. Id. at 509-10, 157 P.2d at 404.
On appeal, the court found that the statute of limitations defense had been waived by the
office of the attorney general. Id. at 515, 157 P.2d at 406. It reasoned that statutes of limitation
are "for the benefit and repose of individuals, and not to secure general objects of policy or
morals" and that they "may, therefore, be waived in legal form, by those who are entitled to it;
and such waiver, when acted upon, becomes an estoppel to plead the statute." Id. at 515, 157
P.2d at 406-07 ("To us, this seems a fair statement of the law."). According to the court, the
office of the attorney general was aware of the waiver's terms and "was also aware that
contained therein were provisions which might postpone beyond the statutory period the time
when plaintiff would commence an action." Id. The potential open-ended nature of the promise
did not affect the court's decision as it specifically found that the statutory period related to the
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agreement to waive the defense would commence to run only when the parties, or one of them,
"ceased to act upon it."

Importantly, the court had found that the attorney general "was

privileged at any time to advise the plaintiff that he would no longer abide by the agreement,
rescind the same, and demand that plaintiff institute legal proceedings to determine the legality
of its possession of the equipment, but instead of taking such course the attorney general chose to
abide by the agreement and [continued] to demand of and to receive from plaintiff storage
charges upon the equipment." Id. at 516, 157 P.2d at 407. Of further import, the attorney
general urged that a statute similar to Idaho's § 5-238 barred the extent of the waiver, but the
court found it inapplicable. Id
In the present case, instead of promising to await for the outcome of separate litigation on
the possession issue, while continuing to accept reimbursements for storage, the State had
promised to continue to work with the Appellants to obtain the necessary approach and public
access to fulfill its obligation. Additionally, like the attorney general in Atlas, the State could
have at any time stated that it would no longer uphold Parry's Promise and forced the Appellants
to file suit, but instead it plainly and regularly acted in a manner that signaled to the Appellants
that it was attempting to fix the access issues, and trying to obtain the needed approach from
ACHD.

Accordingly, the State should be estopped from pursuing its statute of limitations

defense because it was waived by the Parry Promise and never rescinded. 10

10

At least until November 25, 2016, when it filed its Answer.
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ii.

The district court failed to apply the applicable principles underlying the
doctrine of justifiable uncertainty and instead focused on circumstances
limiting previous rulings applying the justifiable uncertainty doctrine.

The district court failed to understand Appellants' arguments based on the doctrine of
justifiable uncertainty that has been upheld in similar circumstances to toll the time required to
pursue an inverse condemnation action. The doctrine was referenced to support an argument that
circumstances warrant a remedy where uncertainty as to the extent and permanence of a taking
are due to the government's actions. The Appellants asked that the district court review the
principles underlying the doctrine to recognize that at the very least, the State's failures to follow
through on their promise to provide access had delayed the date of accrual to on or about May
16, 2016, thus removing the statute of limitation issue.

The court analyzed the cases and

concluded that the principle only applies where there was a gradual and continuing process of
physical events causing a taking, coupled with the government's promise to mitigate the impact.
(R., p. 959.) This unduly limits the application of the principle underlying these cases.
In the justifiable uncertainty cases, the date of accrual for limitations purposes is delayed
under the doctrine while "the Government promises to mitigate the damage caused by a taking,
so that a plaintiff is justifiably uncertain as to the extent and permanence of the damage."
Prakhin v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 483,489 (2015). The applicable inquiry for such a matter
is "when the permanent nature of the taking is evident." Biloxi Marsh Lands Corp. v. United
States, 111 Fed. Cl. 385, 387 (Fed. Cl. 2013). Appellants rely on cases like Applegate v. United
States, 25 F.3d 1579, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994), where the government's repeated promise to build a
plant meant that the landowners "did not know when or if their land would be permanently
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destroyed," and Banks v. United States, 314 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2003), where the circuit court
was required to analyze whether the predictability and permanence of the extent of the damage
was justifiably uncertain because of the government's promises and efforts to mitigate.
Although justifiable uncertainty has not been specifically adopted in Idaho, the principles
underlying the doctrine have been analyzed by the Idaho Supreme Court. See Higginson, 128
Idaho at 442-43, 915 P.2d at 4-5.
In Higginson, the Court analyzed takings caused by gradual conduct and the effect on a
date of accrual for statute of limitations purposes. The Court looked at previous erosion cases
where continuing conduct caused flooding. Regardless of the natural physical occurrences, the
Court concluded that the main factor was the activity by the condemnor that allowed for new
statute of limitations periods. Id. at 443, 915 P.2d at 5 (" ... cases permit recovery based on
additional activity on the part of the dam operators ... ").

In Higginson, there was only one

governmental action that could be identified, and the accrual was based on that activity. Id. In
contrast, here, there was a continual series of actions taken by the State to toll the time
Appellants had to file their claims. However, the district court failed to attach any weight or
responsibility to the State's continuing promise and actions to provide the access solely because
there was not a gradual physical process paralleling the State's actions and promises. (R., p.
959.) The record made it abundantly clear that the State continued its negotiations with ACHD.
(R., pp. 339-59, 428-30.)

It also continued to work towards final resolution despite the

intervening sale and foreclosure discussed below. (R., pp. 339-59.)
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If the State were able to justify its inability to meet its obligations to an outside force, it
would have to be another agency's actions, the ACHD's. Regardless, for purposes of accrual
and statute of limitation issues, it was the State's additional activity that caused the interference
with Appellants' access and prevented the Appellants from learning the full extent of the State's
failure to meet its obligations, and therefore, these circumstances require extension of any
deadline to file suit. Ultimately, ACHD's decision to not allow a public "approach" made clear
that there would be no dedicated public access and that the construction of the Interchange had
actually been a permanent taking of the Appellants' long-sought access to the Property.
Therefore, the date of accrual for limitation purposes could be no sooner than May 2016, as the
Plaintiffs' were justifiably uncertain deprivation of the access to their Property was permanent.
iii.

The district court's insistence that large gaps of years of noncommunication and a sale and foreclosure following Parry's Promise
supported its conclusion indicates that the district court drew no inferences
from the Appellants' pleadings in their favor and also misunderstood the
true nature of the State's original promise and obligation to the Property.

In further support to the district court's waiver analysis, it briefly concludes, disdainfully
and without citation, that a lack of actions or communications between the State and Appellants
between 2001 and 2010 following Parry's explicit written promise and that a later reversed
conveyance terminates any applicable relationship or agreement between the parties. However,
any temporary silence or temporary conveyance, or a mortgage taken back as security (R. p. 257)
should not be interpreted as evidence of the parties' inability to reach an agreement (R. pp. 32526), the touchstone for expiration of Parry's Promise and the commencement of the statute of
limitations (R., p. 941 ).
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a. The Appellants' Complaint provided sufficient detail to support
an inference that the parties continued to communicate and work
together towards a resolution of the access issues.
The written communications in 2001 (Compl., Ex. 17), Mr. Parry's lengthy email of
January 29, 2010 (Compl., Ex. 19), the proposed "Acknowledgement of Public Road Easement"
Parry prepared for signature sometime in 2010 (Compl., Ex. 20), and especially the State's
written request for a Temporary Approach from the ACHD to benefit the Days' lands in 2014
(Compl., Ex. 21), are unequivocally evidence of the ongoing effort to reach an agreement as to
access, as was the State's offer to pay the Days $560,000 in 2015 if they would undertake
building an access road themselves (Compl., Ex. 22), even ifthere had occurred some temporary
suspension of efforts at times.
All of these actions and communications can only be interpreted as evidence of the
parties' ongoing efforts to reach an agreement as to access. Yet, the district court illogically
inferred that each of these items should be considered independently without ongoing
communications between the parties, or an enduring sense of obligation by the State. (R., pp.
959-60.) The district court's conclusion that a gap of ten years of apparent inaction cannot
overcome the contrary inferences supported by the Appellants' Complaint. In light of these
clear, unambiguous actions and communications, the lack of consistent communications is not
significant and not evidence that an agreement could not be reached. In this context, where the
written record at the State's promise to the Day family goes back over a half a century ago to
1961, which Parry's Promise reaffirmed in 2010, a gap of several years is not significant.
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b. The record does not include any evidence to support the district
court's conclusions related to the effect the Groves conveyance
had on the relationship between the parties or agreements reached
between the parties.
The district court also refers to the Groves conveyance to support its conclusions on the
waiver issue by concluding that this conveyance terminated any agreement or understanding the
parties "might have had." (R. p. 960.) The district court did not cite to any rule of law or
evidence in the record for this imposition. In fact, the record includes very little in regards to the
Groves conveyance, except as related to the denied mitigation argument offered in the State's
partial motion for summary judgment. The State filed two exhibits related to its mitigation
argument relating to the conveyance to R. Craig Groves, the December 2005 Buy/Sell
Agreement, and an answer to an interrogatory regarding the sale in December 2005. (R., pp.
203-13.) Those two exhibits provided the district court with no evidence of the deed restrictions,
appurtenances, hereditaments, rights, exclusions, or inclusions in the conveyance to the Groves,
or the mortgage itself, and the right, Appellants retained as mortgagees as neither of these critical
documents were part of the record. (R. p. 257.) It only provided information of the sale and
amounts paid and left owing prior to foreclosure. (See id.; R., p. 732, n.5.) Further, the Buy/Sell
Agreement provided no limitations based on the Appellants' continued interest in the property,
especially since the obligation attached to the property itself as discussed below, and not the
relevant occupants or owners.

Regardless, the district court drew an improper inference,

concluding the conveyance/foreclosure terminated any agreement related to the access issue, an
inference not only improper, but virtually incredulous in the face of the time and extensive
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efforts by the State to deliver access after Groves defaulted and the Days regained complete
control of their Property. The district court erred in improperly relying on information not in the
record to support its conclusions.

Its decision in denying Appellants' partial motion for

summary judgment should be reversed.
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANTS
HA VE NO STANDING TO PURSUE THEIR CONTRACT CLAIMS AND THAT
ONLY TWO APPELLANTS HA VE STANDING TO PURSUE THE INVERSE
CONDEMNATION CLAIM

Appellants also contend that the district court erred in concluding that the Appellants do
not have standing to pursue the breach of contract claims and that only two Appellants have
standing to pursue the inverse condemnation claim. To support its decision, the district court
overlooked or ignored the explicit restriction contained in the 1967 Warranty Deed that runs with
the land, failed to explain how the applicable rights were personal property, did not consider the
extent of the Appellants' rights to the property, and again improperly inferred conclusions from
facts not in the record.

Thus, the district court's decision should be remanded to analyze

property rights based on correct principles of law.
1. The District Court Failed to Consider the Applicability of the Deed Restriction
to the Appellants' Contract Claims and Did Not Consider that the Obligations
Ran With the Land.

The Appellants, owners of the Property, are entitled to sue on their contract claims
because the State is bound by its obligation to provide "access to the Future Frontage Road and
Stock Drives" arising from its acceptance of the Warranty Deed that contained that very
language as an explicit encumbrance on the conveyance to the State. This obligation was a
covenant running with the land and was embodied in the Warranty Deed that was recorded on
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November 10, 1967. Therefore, the district court's finding that there was no evidence that any
contract ran with the Property is in error.
i.

The Warranty Deed obliges the State to provide "access to the Future
Frontage Road and Stock Drives. "

The October 23, 1967 Right-of-Way Contract between the parties stated that in
consideration for the contemporaneous Warranty Deed for highway purposes, the State agreed to
make payment for the land required for the new highway and the abutting access to the old
highway, and that substitute access would be available from the future frontage road and stock
drive on the southwesterly side of the freeway. (R., pp. 42-43.) The Warranty Deed transferring
the land for the new highway included grantors' historic rights of access but contemporaneously
excepted for the benefit of the grantors "access to the Future Frontage Road and Stock Drives on
the Southwesterly side" of the freeway. (R., pp. 44-45.) The land intended to benefit from the
State's express obligation was not the land conveyed to the State at the time, but the remaining
land that was not conveyed to the State but retained by the Days and is expressly identified in the
Warranty Deed as the "remaining contiguous property belonging to Grantor." (See id.)
Thus, the State's obligation was not just a contract right but an appurtenance to the real
estate that was merged into the deed and conveyed to all successors of the original owners, and
now remains vested in the current Appellants. Well-settled law binds a grantee to the covenants
contained in a deed once accepted and the property possessed. West Wood Invs. v. Acord, 141
Idaho 75, 83, 106 P.3d 401, 409 (2005); Sainsbury Constr. Co. v. Quinn, 137 Idaho 269, 272, 47
P.3d 772, 775 (Ct. App. 2002). No circumstances here suggest that the State is exempt from the
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obligation contained in the Warranty Deed and the restriction running with the land the Days
retained as well as the land the state acquired. However, the district court only considered rights
and obligations under the ROW Contract.

The deed reservation entitles the Appellants to

enforce the obligation and the court's failure to recognize the restriction and concomitant benefit
was error. See Hughes Farms, Inc. v. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Assoc., Inc., 182
Neb. 791, 796-97, 157 N.W.2d 384, 388 (1968) (stating reservation of rights to access having
highest legal effect for valuation concerns in condemnation); Henderson v. Iowa State Highway
Comm'n., 260 Iowa 891,897, 151 N.W.2d 473,476 (1967) (noting reservation ofright to access

with highway authorities could be claimed and enforced as a matter of right). This was clear
error and this Court should reverse on this record and enter judgment in Appellants' favor on this
issue, without further consideration by the district court. Killinger, 135 Idaho 322, 17 P.3d 266.
2. The District Court Erred in Finding that the Appellants' Rights Were a Chose
In Action that Were Not Assigned, Ignoring the Appellants' Arguments that the
Rights Were Transferred as Appurtenances.

The Appellants' rights were not a "right to sue," "thing in action," or personalty, as the
district court wrongly concluded by failing to recognize that the benefits and burdens contained
in the Warranty Deed were covenants running with the land. The district court reviewed LC. §
73-l 14(2)(c), (e), and the Black's Law Dictionary meaning of "chose" to conclude that the rights
related to the inverse condemnation claim in this matter were a personal property right in direct
contravention to the reservation in the Warranty Deed. (R., p. 950.) However, the court did not
cite to any authority to support or explain how the claim here was related to the authorities
reviewed, nor did it rely on authority showing that an inverse condemnation award is personal
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property or a chose in action. In fact, the inverse condemnation claim rights in this case are
directly related to real property rights. State ex rel. Morrison v. The/berg, 87 Ariz. 318, 324, 350
P.2d 988, 991 (1960) ("[A]n owner of property abutting on a public highway possesses, as a
matter of law ... a private right or easement for the purpose of ingress and egress to and from his
property which latter right may not be taken away or destroyed or substantially impaired without
compensation therefor."); McMoran v. State, 55 Wash. 2d 37, 39, 345 P.2d 598, 599 (1959)
(This [free and convenient access] right of ingress and egress [to abutting public thoroughfare]
attaches to the land. It is a property right, ... [and] is entitled to just compensation if this right is
taken or damaged." (internal citations and quotations omitted)); see also Hedrick v. Graham, 245
N.C. 249, 255, 96 S.E.2d 129, 133 (1957) (analyzing private right of access to and from the
highway by an abutting landowner and conflicting interests when impaired). Thus, contrary to
the court's line of reasoning, an assignment with a specific reference to an access right, or the
right to sue, should the government condemn one's property is not required.
Real property includes "every interest in lands." Hughes, 80 Idaho at 293, 328 P.2d at
400. This "bundle of rights" is addressed in LC. § 55-101 ("Real property ... consists of: (1)
Lands, possessory rights to land, ditch and water rights, and mining claims, both lode and placer.
(2) That which is affixed to land. (3) That which is appurtenant to land.") and LC. § 73-114
('"Real property"' is coextensive with lands, tenements and hereditaments, possessory rights and
claims."). Further, conveyances of title in land, typically by a deed, include all real property
interests in property owned by the grantor, unless reserved. Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States

(In re SRBA Case No. 39576), 144 Idaho 1, 14, 156 P.3d 502, 515 (2007); Crandall v. Goss, 30
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Idaho 661, 674, 167 P. 1025, 1029 (1917) (title in reserved interest did not pass); Paddock v.

Clark, 22 Idaho 498, 512, 126 P. 1053, 1058 (1912) (Ailshie, J., concurring) ("[A] grant of
appurtenances carries all appurtenances not specifically reserved."); LC.§ 55-101; LC.§ 55-604;
LC. § 73-114. These transferred real property interests can be water rights, mining claims, and
all appurtenances. Id.

i.

The Deeds Transferring the Property Included All Appurtenances and
Hereditaments But the District Court Refused to Consider the Effect of the
Actual Conveyance Language in the Deeds to the Appellants.

The interests that were transferred were encompassed by the hereditament and
appurtenance language of the Appellants' deeds. Notably, the court did not even address this
hereditament or appurtenance language.

The four applicable deeds were part of the record

before the district court. (R., pp. 400-17.) Two of the transfers specifically used both terms
"hereditaments" and "appurtenances." (R., pp. 400-10.) The other two conveyances by deed use
only the term "appurtenances." (R., pp. 411-17.) Either are sufficient to transfer the rights at
issue in this matter. 11
According to Black's Law Dictionary, a "hereditament" is "any property that can be
inherited; anything that passes by intestacy." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004); see also

Tobias v. State Tax Comm 'n, 85 Idaho 250, 255, 378 P.2d 628, 630 (1963) (declaring freehold
estates, including corporeal or incorporeal hereditament, an interest in real property).

No

distinction is made between personalty and realty. Black's Law Dictionary, Online 2d Edition,
defines "hereditaments" as: "Things capable of being inherited, be it corporeal or incorporeal,

11

In fact, under the reading of Joyce Livestock, neither term was required in the first place.
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real, personal, or mixed, and including not only lands and everything thereon, but also heirlooms,
and certain furniture which, by custom, may descend to the heir together with the land."
Even more encompassing and clearly inclusive of the right of access is the definition for
"appurtenance." Black's Law Dictionary, Online 2d Edition, defines "appurtenance" as: "That
which belongs to something else; an adjunct; an appendage; something annexed to another thing
more worthy as principal, and which passes as incident to it, as a right of way or other easement
to land; an outhouse, barn, garden, or orchard, to a house or messuage." (Emphasis added.)

iL

The District Court Did Not Address Circumstances Where Real Property
Transfers Include Rights Relevant to Condemnation Rights.

Even if this Court were to find that these rights are not appurtenances or hereditaments,
under most circumstances, a transfer of property can include the rights to an award for a
condemnation.

Specifically, courts have found that when a conveyance is executed during

ongoing condemnation proceedings during such a time that the condemning party could still
abandon the proceeding, the right to the condemnation award passes, if not reserved, even if no
reference to the award is made in the deed. Bank of America v. Glendale, 4 Cal. 2d 477, 482, 50
P.2d 1035, 1037 (1935) (citing other jurisdictions supporting same rule); see also Clay County v.
Howard, 95 Neb. 389, 145 N.W. 982 (1914) (finding appropriation was not complete at time

land was sold, and that, therefore, a subsequent purchaser was entitled to the compensation).
The reasoning behind the rule appears in a Supreme Court of Washington case:
Where the conveyance of the land pending condemnation is by deed without
reservation, the only certain and just rule is that the money to be paid for the right
to take or damage the property shall be paid to the person or persons owning the
property or having an interest therein at the time when the condemnation has
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reached that point of completion where it is not subject to abandonment, and
when the right to the compensation becomes an enforceable demand against the
condemner.
In re Twelfth Ave. S., 74 Wash. 132, 133, 132 P. 868,869 (1913).

The rule is applicable to the current inverse condemnation action as it is manifest that, if
the State had actually fulfilled its promise to the Appellants, all parties taking the property since
the promise would have taken the property undamaged. See Damon v. Ryan, 74 Wash. 138, 14041, 132 P. 871, 872 (1913). Here, as explained above, once it became clear in 2016 that the
ACHD would not approve a public approach to the Property, it was only then revealed that the
construction of the Interchange was the point in time when the State had substantially impaired
the promised access and gave rise to became an enforceable claim against the State. Until then,
any claim would be premature for the several reasons set out above, including the justifiable
uncertainty doctrine.

Thus, the right to that demand passed with each conveyance of the

Property until it became enforceable. In a sense, it was not until this time that the right to sue
became apparent, whereas before the right was non-existent, or at least contingent, because it
was assumed that the State would fulfill its obligations.

3. The Policy Requiring Symmetry Between Persons Owning Property at Time of
Taking and the Time Suit is Filed Has No Application Here.
Instead of reviewing the relevant property rights and circumstances in this case, the district
court found that four of the six Appellants lacked standing to bring inverse condemnation claims
because they did not own the Property at the time of the temporary taking in 1997-98, citing to
multiple extra-jurisdictional findings. (R., pp. 947-8.) However, each case cites to a policy that
addresses situations where competing owners claim the right to sue for a single taking. Thus, there
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developed a need for a rule to determine who, among competing claimants, should be paid and to
avoid a condemnor being required to pay a condemnation claim twice if the "wrong" party is
paid first. See, e.g., US. v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 18 (1958) (stating issue is whether condemnation
claim vested in owners during 1943 or owners acquiring property in 1945). Here, there is no
debate about who owns the rights to recover from the taking, no evidence of competing claims,
and no one waiting in the wings to sue the State again for the same damages the Appellants seek.
Regardless of which date is relevant here-the date of temporary taking and for valuation
purposes or the date of accrual-no one disputes that the owner of the property is entitled to
compensation. Even viewing the 1997-98 owners, the record is clear that the current Appellants
inherited all applicable rights. (See R., pp. 395-97, 583-98.) Interests in the Property changed
hands among family members, or their succession planning entities, and with gift transfers. (Id.)
The uncontroverted testimony in the record shows that the various conveyances were intended to
transfer all of the rights. Consistently, the testimony of the family members with knowledge and
the estate planning attorney all stated the intent of the three Day brothers' family to keep all
rights and that there is no record of any other separate claims being made. (See R., pp. 584
(stating no knowledge of another assignment, conveyance, or reservation to separate from
family), 594 (stating no other interests reserved or assigned), 597-8 (outlining adoption of
recommended legal plan to transfer all interests within family, and estate-planning attorney's
knowledge of no other conveyance of rights).) Even the district court's decision makes it clear
that if not transferred earlier, upon death it passes to devisees. (R., p. 950; see also Lafontaine 's
Heirs at Law v. Lafontaine 's Heirs at Law, 107 A.2d 653, 657-58 (Md. Ct. App. 1954) (a right to
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a condemnation award would pass to an heir or devisee if the owner of the land passes prior to a
right becoming enforceable against the condemnor); US. v. 198. 73 Acres of Land, 800 F.2d 434,
436 (4th Cir. 1986).)
The district court apparently ignored the implication of its conclusion that a defunct
Living Trust (the Ernest and Lois Day Living Trust) must file the lawsuit rather than the two
sons of the Grantors of the trust who inherited all the assets from that trust; that Bennett Day is
apparently required to file the lawsuit rather than the entity to which he transferred all of his
rights in the Property; and that the estate of Donna Day Jacobs' deceased uncle, Robert Day, is
required to file the lawsuit rather than the functioning living trust that received all his assets.
In sum, the Appellants are the parties that own all property rights related to the Property
passed down within the Appellants' family. This is undisputed. No evidence in the record shows
that any prior owners or third parties might actually claim a competing right to damages from the
taking. 12 As stated above, the record does not suggest that any of the individuals involved with
any interest, or transfer of any interest, in the Property are aware that any member of the
Appellants' family holding or transferring rights in the Property intended, or intend, to separate
any rights in the Property to a third party, including a right to a condemnation award. The
persons most familiar with the circumstances surrounding the deeds, settlement negotiations, and
estate-planning sessions are unaware of any other conveyances prepared or contemplated to
divide any interest in the Property, for the purpose of a reservation or for a separate conveyance
to a non-family member. (See R., pp. 583-85, 593-94, 596-98.) Nor was it ever considered that
12

This includes any rights transferred and recovered in the Groves sale and foreclosure referenced in the court's
decision and analyzed below.
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such efforts would have been made since those rights were transferred pursuant to a partnership
settlement between three brothers years ago. (R., p. 597.) Accordingly, the Property, and all
related interests and rights, is still held in the Appellants' family, as it has been since 1935, even
considering the Groves' transaction and foreclosure analyzed below.

Even if there were

evidence of other parties with a claim to those original taking rights, then the proper response is
not to dismiss some of the Appellants or prevent them from recovering damages for their portion
of the Property. Rather, the proper approach is to allow the matters to proceed on the merits and
recover all damages to the Property and then resolve any competing ownership claims. See First

Fed. Sav. Bank of Twin Falls v. Riedesel Eng'g, Inc., 154 Idaho 626, 630, 301 P.3d 632, 636
(2012) (promoting "overriding policy" of deciding issues between litigants on the merits).
Therefore, this Court should find that the court erred in concluding that four of the Appellants
lacked standing to pursue this matter and reverse its findings without need for remand.

4. The District Court Impermissibly Inferred that Information Not in the Record
May Have Broken the Appellants' Chain of Title to the Rights to an Inverse
Condemnation Award.
Finally, there is no evidence in the record, as the district court nonetheless found, that the
Appellants simply "sold" all their property rights to Craig Groves when he actually gave the
Appellants back a mortgage as security, ultimately defaulting, and thus no basis to find that had
Groves not defaulted on the purchase, the Appellants "would have never again acquired any
interest in the Day Property." (R. p. 949.) Although the mortgage from Groves is not part of this
record, nor the documents related to the foreclosure, it is generally regarded that the mortgagees
would have received back from Groves whatever rights were temporarily transferred to him upon
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his default. 55 Am Jur Mortgages § 733 ("Generally, every right or interest held by a mortgagor
[Groves] in and to the mortgaged property ... passes with the' mortgage"; appurtenant "inures to
the benefit of the mortgagee" or "purchaser at the foreclosure sale"). Such a right includes the
right to recover all rights previously transferred. See, e.g., Bond v. Brown, 2 F.2d 797, 799 (5th
Cir., 1924) (mortgagees have right to prevent impairment of their security).

See, e.g.,

Yellowstone Valley Co. v. Assoc. Mortg. Inv 'rs, 88 Mont. 73, 82, 290 P. 255, 258 (1930) ("A

mortgage of land with the appurtenances covers both the incorporeal hereditaments annexed to
the realty, and also such physical property, or rights to or in connection with it, as are used with
and for the benefit of the land and are reasonably necessary for its proper enjoyment.").
Thus, while the record includes very little related to the conveyance and mortgage, if it
did, it likely would include facts refuting the facts the district court assumed. Therefore, the
district court's conclusion was not based in fact or law and should be overturned.
V.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

If the Appellants are ultimately successful on remand, they are entitled to attorney fees on
appeal pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3) for fees related to their contract claims. See MFG Fin., Inc.
v. Vigos, 163 Idaho 252, 257, 409 P.3d 832, 837 (2018). Attorney fees are allowed on appeal

under LC. § 12-120(3) to the prevailing party for actions based on a breach of contract. Lee v.
Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 12, 189 P.3d 467,474 (2008). Section 12-120(3) provides:

In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill,
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
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Therefore, if Appellants are successful on their contract claim on remand, they will be entitled to
attorney fees on this appeal.

VI.

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons stated above, the Appellants respectfully request that this Court find
that the district court applied the wrong standard ofreview for the State's Motion to Dismiss and
failed to properly consider the facts and inferences related to the State' s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment in favor of the Appellants. The Appellants ask the Court to overrule the
district court's decision and remand the matter for further proceedings below.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Y~ay of May, 2018.
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A .
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(____
Fre\iric V. Shoem~Jason R. Mau
-----ru-(omeys for Appellants
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